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Policing School Discipline 
Catherine Y. Kim† 
INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding the frequent admonishment that 
“students [do not] shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate,”1 courts routinely defer to school officials in 
cases involving the investigation and punishment of youth in 
schools.2 Consequently, youth accused of school misconduct are 
not entitled to the same procedural protections to which they 
would be entitled outside the school context3: school officials may 
search their belongings or persons without a warrant or probable 
cause,4 and officials may question them without first providing 
Miranda warnings.5 Courts and scholars alike defend such 
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Gerhardt, Myriam Gilles, Don Hornstein, Joe Kennedy, Bill Marshall, Eric Muller, 
Richard Myers, Teri Ravenell, Mark Weidemaier, Kimberly West-Faulcon, and the 
participants in the George Washington University Law School faculty workshop and 
the SMU Dedman School of Law faculty workshop for their time and invaluable 
feedback. All errors are my own. I would also like to thank Josh Kinard, Tiffany 
Brown, Robert Lamb, and Kiril Kolev for their excellent research assistance.  
 1 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 2 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) 
(holding that the scope of constitutional rights for public school students is limited by 
“what is appropriate for children in school”). 
 3 See generally William G. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School 
Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 640-41 (1971) 
(comparing procedural rights of student accused of misconduct with those of an adult 
suspected of a crime); Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the 
Law-Abiding Public, 1989 S. CT. REV. 87, 115 (same).  
 4 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (sustaining student search 
where school officials have a reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover evidence 
of criminal activity or a violation of school rules). 
 5 Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this issue, lower 
courts consistently find no custodial interrogation where a youth is questioned by a 
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restrictions on students’ constitutional rights on the ground that 
school discipline, unlike law enforcement, serves the educational 
interests of youth.6 Under this view, the educational value of 
discipline and consequent alignment of interests between official 
and student render the constitutional protections guaranteed 
outside of the school context inapposite in schools.7  
Recent observations of a “school-to-prison pipeline” 
resulting in the increased criminalization of student 
misbehavior, however, cast doubt on this characterization of 
school discipline.8 Today, police officers routinely patrol public 
school hallways on a full-time basis as “school resource officers”; 
and school officials refer a growing number of youth to the 
juvenile and criminal justice systems for school-based 
misconduct.9 These developments call for a critical reassessment 
  
school official. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992); 
State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580, 583 (N.H. 1998); In re Harold S., 731 A.2d 265, 268 
(R.I. 1999); see also Paul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the 
Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 39, 59 n.90 (2006) (discussing 
cases); cf. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding that determination 
of whether youth interrogated at school by police officer is in custody for Miranda 
purposes requires consideration of youth’s age).  
 6 See infra Part I.A; see also Buss, supra note 3, at 570 (describing judicial 
deference to the “mystique of the educational institution”); Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should 
Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 49, 64 (1996) (conceptualizing debate over restrictions on students’ 
constitutional rights as a debate over competing educational goals); James A. Ryan, The 
Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1340-41 (2000) (analyzing limits 
to students’ constitutional rights as measured against academic function of schools).  
 7 See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 118 (analyzing restriction of probable 
cause requirement for student searches as based on the view that Fourth Amendment 
protections “reflect[] a balance appropriate mainly to cases in which private activity 
and public controls are posed in conflict,” which is not the case when students are 
searched for wrongdoing); see also Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, 
and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 294-96 (arguing that 
alignment of individual and collective government interests renders criminal 
procedural protections, such as warrant requirement, unnecessary). But see Laurence 
Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 312 n.28 (1975) 
(critiquing assumption that interests of school official and punished student are 
aligned rather than in conflict for purposes of school discipline). 
 8 See CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: 
STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM (2010); MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: LEGACIES OF 
AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 28 (2010) (utilizing term “school-to-prison pipeline” 
to refer to the way in which “school systems, police, and juvenile justice programs 
combine in a process that removes students from mainstream schools and puts them in 
separate programs that often involve lockup, searches, and little educational value”); Lisa 
H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets 
Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 981 (2010) (noting that “the term 
school-to-prison pipeline” has become “part of our national lexicon,” used to describe “the 
growing trend of school officials to refer students to law enforcement for acts committed 
while in school, and the increasing deployment of police in schools”).  
 9 Infra Part II.B; see also, e.g., Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing 
School Police Officers: A Conceptual and Methodological Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 
591, 599 (2006) (discussing emerging prevalence of police officers in schools); Philip J. 
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of the extent to which contemporary school discipline practices 
advance the educational goals that historically justified their 
insulation from judicial scrutiny.10  
This article evaluates empirical evidence on 
contemporary discipline practices and finds that, in a growing 
number of jurisdictions that rely on law enforcement to 
maintain order in schools, it can no longer be said that the 
investigation and punishment of school misconduct serves the 
accused student’s educational interests, or even the interests of 
the larger student body.  
These changes in the operation of school discipline 
parallel the changes to the juvenile justice system addressed in 
the landmark case of In re Gault.11 Traditionally, youth in 
juvenile court were not entitled to the procedural protections 
guaranteed to adults in criminal court, on the ground that 
juvenile courts, unlike criminal courts, were assumed to be 
nonadversarial institutions designed to further the best 
interests of the youth; young people would receive the 
benevolent protection of court officials in exchange for giving 
up their procedural rights.12 Accumulating evidence of juvenile 
courts’ failure to achieve those beneficent goals, however, led 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Gault to reconsider prior doctrine 
and extend to youth at least some of the procedural rights 
  
Cook, Denise C. Gottfredson & Chongmin Na, School Crime Control and Prevention, 39 
CRIME & JUST. 313 (2010) (observing “greater recourse to arrest and the juvenile courts 
rather than school-based discipline”); Paul Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison? The 
Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79 
(2008) (analyzing criminalization of student misconduct); Michael P. Krezmien et al., 
Juvenile Court Referrals and the Public Schools: Nature and Extent of the Practice in 
Five States, 26 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 273 (2010) (examining data on rising incidence 
of school-based arrest); Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the 
Criminalization of Student Behavior, 37 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 280 (2009) (analyzing role of 
police officers in schools).  
 10 See Holland, supra note 5 (arguing for consideration of increased policing 
in schools in determining Miranda rights for youth questioned at school); Josh Kagan, 
Reappraising T.L.O.’s “Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-Law Enforcement 
Entanglement, 33 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 304, 321 (2004) (contending that probable cause 
should be required for student searches in schools where police officers are 
permanently staffed at school, security cameras are prevalent, and school officials are 
required to report criminal incidents to police); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to 
the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches 
Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1070-71 (2003) (arguing 
that student searches should require probable cause if search could result in criminal 
liability); Jacqueline A. Stefkovich & Judith A. Miller, Law Enforcement Officers in 
Public Schools: Student Citizens in Safe Havens?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25 (exploring 
doctrinal issues arising from police involvement in public schools).  
 11 387 U.S. 1 (1967). This parallel between juvenile justice and school discipline 
was presciently drawn as early as 1971 by William G. Buss. Buss, supra note 3. 
 12 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-17. 
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formerly limited to adults in criminal court.13 Courts today 
likewise should evaluate evidence of school discipline’s 
achievement of its beneficent goals, and modify accordingly the 
procedural protections available to youth in public schools.  
Part I explores the development of the educational 
theory of school discipline in legal doctrine, focusing on the role 
that social science has played to restrict the procedural rights 
of students. The Supreme Court has reasoned that school 
discipline—in stark contrast to law enforcement—serves the 
educational interests of the student who is investigated and 
punished; for this reason, constitutional rights that would be 
available to youth outside of school are not available to them in 
the context of school discipline. In the early foundational cases 
establishing these restrictions, members of the Court relied on 
personal intuitions about school discipline, even when those 
intuitions conflicted with empirical evidence properly 
presented before them. More recent cases, however, suggest an 
increased willingness to scrutinize the impact of school 
discipline practices in determining whether the deference 
traditionally afforded to school officials remains warranted.  
Part II analyzes empirical findings on contemporary 
school discipline practices and their pedagogical impact, 
focusing on school-based arrests and other forms of referral to 
law enforcement. Analyzing a number of recent empirical 
studies, this part finds that schools increasingly rely on law 
enforcement to maintain order, although the extent to which 
they do varies. It then explores scholarship from related 
disciplines in education, sociology, and criminology to conclude 
that the use of law enforcement in schools has a negative 
impact on educational outcomes, not only for the investigated 
youth, but also for the larger student body. These findings 
suggest that the investigation and punishment of students in 
at least some jurisdictions no longer serves the pedagogical 
interests that traditionally justified exempting students from 
procedural protections.  
Part III sets forth a framework for courts and 
nonjudicial actors to take such social science evidence into 
account. It proposes that courts engage in a factual assessment 
of school discipline practices to determine whether the 
traditional rationale for denying youth in schools constitutional 
  
 13 Id. at 18-24. 
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procedural rights remains warranted.14 Given the significant 
variance across jurisdictions in school discipline practices, the 
analysis employed should be location-specific. The presumption 
that school discipline serves pedagogical goals would be 
preserved, but could be rebutted with evidence showing that 
disciplinary practices in the particular school or district at 
issue do not further the educational interests of accused 
youths. Where a court finds that school discipline operates 
primarily to further law enforcement goals rather than 
pedagogical goals, investigations of student misconduct should 
be presumed to be adversarial and thus subject to the full scope 
of constitutional protections that would be available to youth 
outside the school context. By contrast, where school discipline 
practices are found to adhere to the traditional model of 
discipline in furtherance of pedagogical goals, doctrinal 
restrictions on students’ constitutional rights would remain in 
place. Part III then considers the role of nonjudicial actors, 
arguing that those who make the substantive determination as 
to whether certain forms of conduct should be criminalized in 
the first instance will play a critical part in any reform effort.  
I. DOCTRINAL RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENTS’ PROCEDURAL 
RIGHTS  
Courts routinely defer to school officials in cases 
involving the investigation and punishment of students.15 A 
schoolchild accused of bringing a water pistol to school or 
tearing a page out of a book does not enjoy the same 
constitutional rights as an adult or child suspected of a 
criminal act on the street.16 School officials may search the 
  
 14 See Tamar Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for 
Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1495-98 (2009) (urging judges and lawmakers to 
review empirical data on impact of school discipline practices). See generally DAVID L. 
FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 97 
(2008) (arguing courts should revisit precedent that is based on outmoded empirical 
beliefs); John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. 
COMMENT. 69, 91 (2008) (prescribing litigation process for social fact finding within 
courts); Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. 
L. REV. 1049 (2006) (critiquing judicial failure to consider impact of changed 
circumstances on doctrine). 
 15 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) 
(holding that scope of constitutional rights for public school students is limited by 
“what is appropriate for children in school”). 
 16 See Buss, supra note 3, at 640-41 (discussing constitutional rights of a 
student accused of tearing a page out of a book); Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 115 
(comparing the rights of a “student with a water pistol” with those of an adult 
suspected of a crime).  
866 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:3 
youth’s backpack without a warrant or probable cause17 and 
question the youth without first providing Miranda warnings.18 
Moreover, courts impose these restrictions on rights regardless 
of the relative seriousness of the offense or even the prospect of 
criminal prosecution.19 Indeed, some courts have denied these 
criminal procedural guarantees to youth in schools even where 
a uniformed police officer participated in the investigation.20  
While there has always been substantial disagreement 
within the scholarly literature over the extent to which 
constitutional rights should be restricted in the public school 
context, both sides of the debate share a common starting point: 
such restrictions must be justified, if at all, by pedagogical 
goals.21 For example, James E. Ryan has argued that courts 
grant special deference to school officials when—and only 
  
 17 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 18 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 19 See Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 318, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2004) (rejecting 
requirement for probable cause where student was suspected of bringing firearm to 
school); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992) (rejecting 
Miranda warnings for questioning by school official where principal intended to turn 
over incriminating evidence of the student’s drug dealing to police); State v. Tinkham, 
719 A.2d 580, 583 (N.H. 1998) (holding that school officials need not provide Miranda 
warnings prior to questioning student suspected of dealing drugs); In re Harold S., 731 
A.2d 265, 268 (R.I. 1999) (concluding school principal who conferred with police was not 
required to provide Miranda warnings prior to questioning the student). 
 20 The Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question of the standard for 
student searches conducted “in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement 
agencies.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985). Absent such guidance, 
lower courts have split. Compare People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996) 
(holding search conducted by school resource officer subject to reasonable suspicion 
standard rather than ordinary probable cause requirements), and In re Josue T., 989 
P.2d 431 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (same), and R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Tenn. 
2008) (same), and In re Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682 (Wis. 1997) (rejecting probable 
cause requirement for search by police officer at the request of and in conjunction with 
school officials), with A.J.M. v. State, 617 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) 
(applying probable cause standard to search by school resource officer), and Patman v. 
State, 537 S.E.2d 118 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (applying probable cause to search by police 
officer on special detail to the school). 
  With respect to students’ right to Miranda warnings prior to school 
interrogation, compare State v. Schloegel, 769 N.W.2d 130, 133-34 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) 
(finding no custodial interrogation during questioning of student at school by police 
because if the student was “in custody at all, [he] was in the custody of the school and was 
not being detained by the police at the time”), with In re T.A.G., 663 S.E.2d 392, 396 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that involvement of school resource officer transforms 
interrogation by school principal into custodial interrogation requiring Miranda 
warnings). But see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (rejecting argument 
that interrogation of youth at school by police never qualifies as custodial interrogation).  
  For scholarly discussion of the procedural rights applicable to school-based 
investigations involving police officers, see Holland, supra note 5, at 45-58; Kagan, 
supra note 10, at 316-20; Pinard, supra note 10, at 1080-90; Peter Price, When Is a 
Police Officer an Officer of the Law?: The Status of Police Officers in Schools, 99 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 541, 560-67 (2009). 
 21 See supra note 6.  
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when—they are acting in their privileged role as educators and 
transmitters of knowledge.22 Similarly, Ann Proffitt Dupre has 
characterized the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in school 
discipline cases as reflective of a larger debate about competing 
educational goals.23  
Central to this defense of restrictions on students’ rights 
is the assumed alignment of interests between students and 
school officials.24 Procedural protections guaranteed in the 
criminal context have been deemed unnecessary in the school 
context to the extent that the investigation and punishment of 
student misconduct—in stark contrast to the investigation and 
punishment of ordinary crime—is for the youth’s own 
educational benefit, teaching the importance of respect for 
others and acceptance of responsibility. Therefore, the standard 
calculus applicable outside the school discipline context—
balancing the tradeoff between the individual interest and the 
competing collective or state interest—has been deemed 
inapplicable in schools. Analyzing restrictions on students’ 
privacy rights during school searches, Stephen Schulhofer has 
reasoned that “[b]oth the investigating authority and the person 
searched are participants in a shared mission,” rendering 
inapposite ordinary constitutional protections that “reflect[] a 
balance appropriate mainly to cases in which the private activity 
and public controls are poised in conflict.”25 Under this view, the 
convergence of interests between school official and student, 
unlike the adversarial interests of the adult criminal suspect 
and law enforcement, obviates the need for the robust 
protections guaranteed in the law enforcement context.  
This part traces the development of this pedagogical 
theory in the three foundational cases in school discipline—
Goss v. Lopez, involving school suspension; Ingraham v. 
Wright, involving corporal punishment; and New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., involving student searches. Each of these cases relied 
on the view that school discipline educationally benefits the 
punished youth to justify restrictions on students’ rights. 
Interestingly, although the Court frequently relies on social 
science evidence in determining educational rights in other 
contexts, most famously in footnote eleven of Brown v. Board of 
  
 22 Ryan, supra note 6, at 1341. He continues, “the further a policy moves away 
from the core academic function of schools, the more likely the Court will apply 
traditional constitutional rules to judge the policy and strike it down.” Id.  
 23 Dupre, supra note 6, at 64.  
 24 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 25 Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 117-18.  
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Education,26 these foundational school discipline cases are 
notable for the conspicuous absence of social science support for 
their conclusions. Rather, in these cases, members of the Court 
relied almost exclusively on personal intuitions regarding the 
operation of school discipline, even when those intuitions 
conflicted with empirical evidence properly before the Court. 
However, more recent cases demonstrate an increased 
willingness to factually assess the operation of school discipline 
to determine whether the judicial deference traditionally 
afforded to school officials remains warranted.  
A. The Foundational Cases 
Judicial reliance on the perceived educational value of 
school discipline to impose limits on students’ procedural rights 
dates at least to Goss v. Lopez,27 decided in 1975, the first time 
the Supreme Court addressed the scope of these rights. During 
race-related tensions at a high school, lead plaintiff Dwight 
Lopez was in the school lunchroom when a group of black 
students entered and began overturning tables.28 Lopez claimed 
he immediately left the lunchroom and did not participate in 
any of the disruptive activities.29 After he was suspended for 
this incident, he filed a class action lawsuit arguing that the 
refusal to provide students with any opportunity to assert 
innocence and challenge a school suspension violated 
procedural due process rights.30  
On certiorari, a majority of the Court held that school 
discipline proceedings are subject only to minimal due process 
protections. Suspensions of up to ten days require only an 
“informal give-and-take” between the principal and the 
student, which need not occur prior to the suspension.31 
Acknowledging that these limitations provide individuals 
facing a denial of education with fewer procedural protections 
than those afforded to individuals facing a denial of, for 
example, welfare benefits or a driver’s license, the Court 
emphasized that unlike other forms of state sanctions, school 
  
 26 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954); see Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of 
Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005) 
(discussing influence of footnote eleven in use of empiricism in education cases).  
 27 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 28 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1284-85 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff’d sub 
nom. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 29 Id. at 1285. 
 30 Id. at 1281. 
 31 Goss, 419 U.S. at 584.  
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discipline serves a pedagogical purpose designed for the benefit 
of the child: “Suspension is considered not only to be a 
necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational 
device.”32 The Court expressed concern that imposing additional 
due process requirements on school discipline would “destroy 
its effectiveness as part of the teaching process.”33  
Justice Powell’s dissent would have gone further, 
reasoning that the educational value of school discipline justifies 
the denial of any procedural due process protections.34 His 
position expressly emphasized what the majority had only 
implied: both the punished student and the disciplining school 
official have a shared interest in swift and informal punishment, 
rendering traditional due process protections inappropriate. 
Justice Powell stated, “When an immature student merits 
censure for his conduct, he is rendered a disservice if appropriate 
sanctions are not applied or if procedures for their application are 
so formalized as to invite a challenge to the teacher’s authority.”35 
Accusing the majority of “misapprehending the reality of the 
normal teacher-pupil relationship,” the dissent insisted that 
“[u]nlike the divergent and even sharp conflict of interests 
usually present where due process rights are asserted, the 
interests here implicated⎯of the State through its schools and of 
the pupils⎯are essentially congruent.”36  
Importantly, neither opinion cited any social science 
support for its assumptions about the benefits of school 
discipline—nor could it. The record before the Court—far from 
validating the educational value of school suspensions—was 
replete with facts indicating that school suspensions harm 
students. Students testified at trial to the negative impact that 
the suspension and subsequent loss of instruction time had on 
their academic progress, and two prominent psychologists gave 
expert testimony regarding the adverse consequences of 
suspensions.37 Based on this evidence, the district court entered 
factual findings that school suspensions are harmful to 
students and may compromise academic achievement.38 On 
  
 32 Id. at 580.  
 33 Id. at 583.  
 34 Id. at 585-86 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 35 Id. at 593.  
 36 Id. at 591, 594.  
 37 Appellees’ Brief on the Merits at 12-13, 33-34, Goss, 419 U.S 565 (No. 73-
898), 1974 WL 185915 (citing testimony from trial record). 
 38 Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1292 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (finding, as a 
matter of fact, that “[m]ost students respond [to suspensions] in one or more of the 
following ways: (1) The suspension is a blow to the student’s self-esteem. (2) The 
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appeal, the student-appellees cited numerous scholarly articles 
further demonstrating the educational harms associated with 
suspensions, and amicus briefs filed by the NAACP, the 
Children’s Defense Fund, and the ACLU likewise cited studies 
describing the negative repercussions of school suspensions on 
children, including reputational harm to the student, loss of 
instructional time, exacerbation of deviant behavior, lower high 
school graduation rates, and fewer future employment 
opportunities.39 Yet the majority ignored these facts altogether. 
Justice Powell’s dissent acknowledged them, but dismissed 
them with little discussion as “generalized opinion evidence.”40 
With no mention of the clearly erroneous standard applicable 
to the trial court’s findings of fact,41 Justice Powell summarily 
reached the contrary factual conclusion, that “[f]or average, 
normal children—the vast majority—suspension for a few days 
is simply not a detriment; it is a commonplace occurrence . . . it 
leaves no scars; affects no reputations; indeed, it often may be 
viewed by the young as a badge of some distinction and a 
welcome holiday.”42 In this way, restrictions on procedural due 
process rights in public schools rested on the unsupported 
factual contention that school discipline furthers the 
educational interests of the suspended student.  
Two years later in Ingraham v. Wright43 the Court again 
invoked the perceived educational value of school discipline, 
this time to reject a constitutional challenge to abuse in the 
administration of corporal punishment. In Ingraham, a student 
who was slow to respond to a teacher’s instructions was hit 
  
student feels powerless and helpless. (3) The student views school authorities and 
teachers with resentment, suspicion and fear. (4) The student learns withdrawal as a 
mode of problem solving. (5) The student has little perception of the reasons for the 
suspension. He does not know what offending acts he committed. (6) The student is 
stigmatized by his teachers and school administrators as deviant. They expect the 
student to be a troublemaker in the future. A student’s suspension may also result in 
his family and neighbors branding him as a troublemaker. Ultimately repeated 
suspension may result in academic failure.”), aff’d sub nom. Goss, 419 U.S. 565. 
 39 Appellees’ Brief on the Merits at 34-36, Goss, 419 U.S 565 (No. 73-898); 
Brief for the Children’s Defense Fund of the Washington Research Project et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 65-68, Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (No. 73-898), 1974 WL 
185919; Brief of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People et al. 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 14-15, Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (No. 73-898), 1974 
WL 185916; Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellees at 6, Goss, 419 U.S. 565 (No. 73-898), 1974 WL 185918.  
 40 Goss, 419 U.S. at 597-98 & n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 41 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2583 (3d ed. 2010). 
 42 Goss, 419 U.S. at 598 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 43 430 U.S. 651 (1977).  
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twenty times with a paddle, resulting in a hematoma requiring 
medical attention, while another student lost use of his arm for 
a week because of a teacher’s paddling.44 Rejecting the students’ 
Eighth Amendment and due process claims, the Court 
reasoned that “since before the American Revolution,” corporal 
punishment has been viewed as necessary for the “moderate 
correction” of a child’s misbehavior and “for the proper 
education of the child.”45 The Court acknowledged that its 
holding meant that youth in schools enjoyed fewer protections 
than convicted criminals, as criminals subjected to corporal 
punishment would clearly be entitled to raise a constitutional 
challenge to that punishment.46 Nonetheless, the Court imposed 
a categorical distinction between punishment in the law 
enforcement context and punishment in the school discipline 
context, concluding that the “prisoner and the schoolchild stand 
in wholly different circumstances”47 with respect to the 
constitutional rights to which they are entitled.  
As in Goss, the Ingraham Court made little effort to 
garner factual support for its assumptions about corporal 
punishment. At the trial level, plaintiff-schoolchildren 
submitted evidence of repeated physical abuse in the 
administration of corporal punishment, which would destroy 
whatever educational value might otherwise inhere in its use. 
The district court did not enter any factual findings about the 
credibility of testimony regarding these allegations, but 
concluded that—even if the testimony were credible—no relief 
would be granted.48 The Supreme Court, rather than engaging 
with the evidence of abuse, simply assumed this abuse was 
infrequent, thereby obviating the need for the requested 
procedural protections. Instead of invoking factual support, the 
majority relied on its “common-sense judgment that excessive 
corporal punishment is exceedingly rare in the public schools.”49 
Criticizing the lack of evidentiary support for the majority’s 
claims, the dissenting four Justices accused the majority of 
relying on “mere armchair speculation” to justify denials of 
constitutional rights to schoolchildren.50  
  
 44 Id. at 657.  
 45 Id. at 661-62, 664.  
 46 Id. at 669.  
 47 Id. at 664-71. 
 48 Id. at 658. 
 49 Id. at 677 n.45. 
 50 Id. at 690 n.7 (White, J., dissenting). 
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Finally, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court relied on the 
purported educational value of school discipline and 
consequent alignment of interests between student and school 
official to limit the scope of Fourth Amendment protections 
available in public schools.51 In T.L.O., a school principal 
searched the purse of a student accused of smoking cigarettes; 
smoking was a violation of school rules but not of any criminal 
law. During the course of the search, the principal found items 
implicating the student in drug dealing, which he turned over 
to the police to be used against the student in subsequent 
delinquency proceedings.52  
Holding that school officials may search a student’s 
person or belongings absent the warrant or probable cause that 
would be required outside of the school context, the Court 
reasoned that to hold otherwise would compromise “the value of 
preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.”53 
Justice Powell’s concurrence repeated his insistence from Goss 
that the alignment of interests presented in school discipline 
cases “make[s] it unnecessary to afford students the same 
constitutional protections granted adults and youths in a 
nonschool setting.”54 This alignment, he reasoned, sharply 
distinguished the teacher-student relationship from that of 
citizens and law enforcement officers:  
Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal 
suspects. These officers have the responsibility to investigate 
criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and 
to facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial. 
Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist between school 
authorities and pupils.55  
Similarly, Justice Blackmun’s concurrence reasoned that the 
educational role of teachers excused them from ordinary 
Fourth Amendment standards: “A teacher’s focus is, and 
should be, on teaching and helping students, rather than on 
developing evidence against a particular troublemaker.”56  
Again, the Court in T.L.O. appeared to rely on common-
sense intuitions about what is good for the child, rather than 
engaging in a fact-based inquiry. Indeed, the contention 
  
 51 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 52 Id. at 328-29.  
 53 Id. at 340. 
 54 Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 55 Id. at 349-50.  
 56 Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
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regarding an alignment of interests between student and 
school official, purported to distinguish the relationship from 
that between police officer and suspect, was undercut by the 
facts of T.L.O. itself: the school official ultimately referred the 
student to law enforcement and the juvenile court.57 Yet, rather 
than performing any empirical inquiry into the frequency with 
which the interests of accused students conflict with those of 
school officials, the Court deemed that rate to be sufficiently 
“rare” to justify restricting students’ rights. Underscoring the 
absence of evidentiary support for the majority’s claims, Justice 
Brennan’s dissenting opinion characterized the majority’s 
rationales as “brief nods by the Court in the direction of a 
neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an 
unanalyzed exercise of judicial will” designed to “reach[] a 
predetermined conclusion acceptable to this Court’s impressions 
of what authority teachers need.”58  
In these foundational cases, then, the Court has relied 
on the assumed educational value of school discipline and the 
purported convergence of interests between school official and 
student to conclude that ordinary procedural protections are 
inapplicable in schools.  
It is true, however, that these cases did not rely 
exclusively on these premises to justify limits on students’ 
procedural rights. Rather, the Court has suggested an 
additional justification for such restrictions—the weighty 
interests of other students in maintaining an environment 
conducive to learning.59 Goss emphasized that the maintenance 
of order and discipline is “essential if the educational function 
is to be performed,”60 and T.L.O. underscored the heavy weight 
  
 57 Id. at 372 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(challenging the assumption that law enforcement and school discipline categorically 
differ by pointing out that T.L.O. herself was subject to prosecution as a delinquent as 
a result of the search); see also Tribe, supra note 7, at 312 (“[E]ven if one concedes that 
there is no inherent clash in the interest of teacher and student, does it not remain 
possible for them to clash in fact . . . ?”). 
 58 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 367, 369 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 59 See Ryan, supra note 6, at 1341, 1411-14 (interpreting limits to 
constitutional rights in school discipline cases as resting on the view that they are 
necessary to “preserve an atmosphere that is safe and conducive to learning” and “to 
maintain discipline in order to transmit academic knowledge”); see also Tribe, supra 
note 7, at 312 (“[E]ven if in general the teachers’ and child’s interest truly converge, at 
the moment of suspension convergence must surely turn into clash: the teacher is 
saying that the best interests of other students will be served by this particular 
student’s suspension.”). 
 60 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). 
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of the “[s]chool’s interest in maintaining an environment where 
learning can take place.”61  
As a purely doctrinal matter, however, this alternative 
justification proves less than satisfactory. While few would 
contest that the state interest in providing a functional 
educational environment is significant, the Court has not 
attempted to explain why this interest would outweigh the 
individual student’s interest if those interests are in fact in 
conflict. Outside the school context, the state interest in 
preventing violent street crimes is of course significant, yet it 
does not outweigh the individual interest in receiving full 
procedural protections. It is not at all clear why this calculus 
balancing competing interests between state and individual 
should not apply in the school context as well. Perhaps 
recognizing this deficiency, the Court has relied on this 
alternative argument only to buttress its more primary 
assumptions regarding the perceived educational value to the 
investigated or punished student and the purported absence of 
adversarial interests in the context of school discipline.  
B. Recent Cases and the Consideration of Evidentiary 
Support  
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s earlier reluctance 
to engage with empirical evidence in this area, more recent cases 
suggest an increased willingness to assess the actual operation 
of school discipline in particular jurisdictions to determine 
whether the traditional deference remains warranted. In these 
opinions, the Court has begun to consider the purpose and 
impact of the investigation and punishment of students.62 
Moreover, where evidence suggested that a particular 
disciplinary practice negatively impacts the education of 
students, the Court has concluded that judicial interference is 
warranted.  
Vernonia School District v. Acton63 and Board of 
Education v. Earls64 examined suspicionless drug testing in 
  
 61 469 U.S. at 326. More recently, in sustaining the suspicionless drug testing 
of student-athletes, the Court in Vernonia School District v. Acton emphasized that 
schools routinely require students to submit to invasions of their privacy not only “for 
their own good,” but also for “that of their classmates.” 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1994). 
 62 See generally Rachel R. Moran, What Counts as Knowledge? A Reflection on 
Race, Social Science, and the Law, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 515 (2010) (discussing 
historical changes in the Supreme Court’s willingness to consider empirical evidence to 
support factual suppositions). 
 63 515 U.S. 646 (1995).  
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public schools. In Acton, the Court sustained such tests for 
student athletes, but only after conducting a factual 
assessment of how the search policy operated in the particular 
school at issue and the actual impact of the policy on students. 
Rather than simply assume, as it had done in prior cases, that 
the investigation of students for drug use benefited students, 
the Court analyzed empirical evidence of the dangers of drug 
use to students, and then sustained the policy only after it 
satisfied itself that the particular drug tests at issue were 
“undertaken for prophylactic and distinctly non-punitive 
purposes,” as school policy dictated that the results of any 
positive tests would not be turned over to law enforcement 
authorities.65 Thus, the Court engaged in a factual, school-
specific inquiry before concluding that the interests of the 
student and school officials were aligned, rendering 
unnecessary the individualized suspicion that would be 
required outside of the school context.66 Similarly, in Earls, the 
Court sustained suspicionless drug testing of students 
participating in extracurricular activities only after engaging 
in a factual inquiry regarding the operation of the drug testing 
policy in the particular school and concluding that the drug 
tests benefited rather than harmed the tested student in large 
part because under school policy the results were not turned 
over to law enforcement or used to punish the student.67  
Even more explicitly, in Safford v. Redding, the Court 
engaged in a factual inquiry to test the long-held categorical 
assumption that the investigation and punishment of student 
wrongdoing benefits the student.68 In Redding, school officials 
strip searched a thirteen-year-old student accused of bringing 
prescription-strength ibuprofen to school. Although the Court 
affirmed T.L.O.’s holding that the school setting requires only a 
reasonable suspicion to justify a student search, it nonetheless 
considered the actual impact of the search on the student and 
concluded that the student’s Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated. Rather than assuming, as it had in T.L.O., that 
school searches categorically advance the educational interests 
  
 64 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
 65 515 U.S. at 658 & n.2.  
 66 By focusing on the operation of a school discipline practice in a particular 
school, the Court appeared to treat the impact of school discipline on youth as an 
adjudicative fact rather than a legislative one. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to 
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942).  
 67 536 U.S. at 833. 
 68 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). 
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of the searched student, the Court cited the amicus brief for the 
National Association of Social Workers and an article from the 
Journal of School Psychology to emphasize the negative 
psychological impact of a strip search on youth.69 Redding thus 
suggests an increased willingness by the Court to evaluate—
rather than simply assume—the impact of investigations and 
punishments on students in determining whether the rights of 
those students warrant restriction.  
II. EMERGING MODES OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 
As set forth in the previous part, doctrinal restrictions 
on the rights of youth accused of school-based misconduct rest 
on a series of factual assumptions about the manner in which 
school discipline operates and the educational value of this 
discipline. Specifically, the Supreme Court has limited these 
rights in public schools on the ground that the investigation 
and punishment of students is intended for the students’ 
educational benefit. Thus, it has reasoned, the adversarial 
relationship characteristic of law enforcement encounters 
outside of the school context simply does not apply to 
investigations of student misconduct to necessitate the same 
level of procedural protections. Recently, the Court has 
appeared willing to assess the facts underlying these 
assumptions. Based on this development, this part evaluates 
empirical evidence of contemporary school discipline practices 
and their educational impact on students.70  
As others have observed, the past two decades witnessed 
a dramatic shift in public discourse, with an increasing focus on 
school safety and crime prevention.71 This part evaluates how 
that shift has manifested in the operation of school discipline. It 
first provides an overview of policy developments that led to a 
convergence of school discipline and law enforcement. Next, it 
reviews a series of recently published studies measuring the 
extent to which school officials rely on law enforcement to 
maintain order. Finally, it analyzes social science research 
  
 69 Id. at 2641-42 (citations omitted). 
 70 See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 997, 1007 (2006) (discussing value of empirical research to measure legal 
doctrines’ progress toward expressed normative goals). 
 71 See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE 
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF 
FEAR 207-31 (2007).  
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examining the likely impact of law enforcement referrals on 
educational outcomes. Based on these findings, this part 
concludes that, at least in some jurisdictions, school discipline no 
longer serves the educational interests that traditionally 
justified insulating it from ordinary constitutional requirements.  
A. The Shift Toward School Crime Control 
Following a series of school shootings in the 1990s, a 
widespread sense of panic descended on public schools across the 
nation. A year after the shooting at Columbine High School in 
1999, almost two-thirds of Americans reported feeling it was 
somewhat likely or very likely that a school-shooting spree would 
occur in their community.72 As one scholar put it, “policy makers 
reacted abruptly to what they perceived to be a huge swing in 
public opinion: a moral panic swept the country as parents and 
children suddenly feared for their safety at school.”73 Importantly, 
this fear extended to predominantly white suburban and rural 
areas; school violence was no longer contained in the 
predominantly minority, low-income, inner-city neighborhoods 
traditionally associated with crime. Republican Senator Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, for example, stated,  
These recent school shootings have occurred in suburbs, small towns, 
and major metropolitan areas all across our nation. They have 
shattered the myth that school violence is a problem solely confined 
to the inner cities. Events now clearly show that the potential for 
serious and deadly school violence is everywhere.74  
Indeed, a poll conducted in 1999 found that suburban and rural 
parents were more likely than minority parents to feel a school 
shooting was somewhat likely or very likely to occur in their 
communities.75  
This fear resulted in the deployment of large numbers of 
police officers to patrol public school hallways. Today, nearly 
  
 72 Mark Gillespie, One in Three Say It Is Very Likely that Columbine-Type 
Shootings Could Happen in Their Community, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2000), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/2980/One-Three-Say-Very-Likely-ColumbineType-Shootings-
Could.aspx. 
 73 ELIZABETH DONOHUE ET AL., SCHOOL HOUSE HYPE: SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 
AND THE REAL RISKS KIDS FACE IN AMERICA 3 (1998).  
 74 144 CONG. REC. 14, 187 (1998) (statement of Sen. Ben Campbell).  
 75 Mark Gillespie, School Violence Still a Worry for American Parents, 
GALLUP (Sept. 7, 1999), http://www.gallup.com/poll/3613/School-Violence-Still-Worry-
American-Parents.aspx. 
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half of all public schools have assigned police officers,76 and 60 
percent of high school teachers report armed police officers 
stationed on school grounds.77 Often with the help of federal 
funding, school-based police officers, frequently referred to as 
“school resource officers,” are the fastest-growing segment of 
law enforcement.78 These officers’ roles vary significantly across 
schools, with some charged primarily with enforcement of 
criminal laws, while others are focused on mentoring, 
counseling, and teaching duties.79  
The reliance on law enforcement to maintain school 
order is not limited to jurisdictions with school resource 
officers. Jurisdictions lacking the resources to hire full-time 
police personnel nonetheless may regularly summon the local 
police department through calls for service. Indeed, rapidly 
spreading “zero-tolerance” policies mandate that school officials 
call the police any time certain predetermined infractions are 
committed. In Rhode Island, a statewide policy requires school 
principals to report all school fights to the police for criminal 
prosecution.80 Alabama requires all principals to notify law 
enforcement any time a person violates district policies 
regarding physical harm or threats of harm.81  
Similar mandates have been adopted at the local district 
level as well. The Atlanta Public School System, for example, 
maintains a zero-tolerance policy requiring school officials to 
immediately report to the police any student involved in drug-
related offenses or gang activity.82 Chicago Public Schools began 
requiring school officials to notify police of all burglary, 
aggravated assault, and gang activity offenses, while providing 
administrators with discretion to refer students to the police for 
  
 76 BARBARA RAYMOND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. POLICING 
SERVS., ASSIGNING POLICE OFFICERS TO SCHOOLS (2010).  
 77 Hirschfield, supra note 9, at 82. 
 78 David Snyder, A New Generation of School Safety Patrol: Officers Boost 
Security, Community Connection, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2003, at T8 (quoting executive 
director of the National Association of School Resource Officers). 
 79 PETER FINN & JACK MCDEVITT, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SCHOOL 
RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS 43 (2005). 
 80 140 CONG. REC. 10281 (1994).  
 81 ALA. CODE § 16-1-24.1 (2010); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 
(West 2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-113 (2007); 14 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 14 § 4112 
(2007); FL. STAT. ANN. § 1006.13 (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1184 (2009); 105 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-21.7 (LexisNexis 2007). 
 82 ATLANTA PUB. SCH., 2010-2011 STUDENT HANDBOOK 22-23 (2010), 
available at http://www.atlanta.k12.ga.us/cms/lib/GA01000924/Centricity/Domain/94/ 
StudentHandbook.pdf. 
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lesser offenses such as gambling, forgery, or petty theft.83 The 
Houston Independent School District requires school principals 
to notify the police any time there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that a student has engaged in any criminal offense at 
school.84 The East Carroll Parish School System in Louisiana, a 
small, rural district, requires that law enforcement remove and 
file charges against any student age twelve or over who is an 
aggressor in a fight.85 Guilford County Schools system in North 
Carolina requires that school officials call the police every time 
an aggravated assault, sexual offense, weapons offense, or drug 
possession is suspected.86 Nelson County Public Schools system 
in Virginia requires schools to refer to the police all instances of 
drug offenses, violence, interference with school authorities, and 
driving without a license on campus.87  
As the scope of these zero-tolerance policies suggests, 
the infractions for which students are referred to law 
enforcement have expanded considerably. Numerous states 
criminalize the offense of disrupting school activities88 or 
  
 83 CHI. PUB. SCH., STUDENT CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
FOR THE 2010-2011 SCHOOL YEAR 8, 13-16 (2010), available at http://policy.cps.k12.il.us/ 
documents/705.5.pdf. 
 84 HOUS. INDEP. SCH. DIST., CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT 14 (2010), available at 
http://www.houstonisd.org/HISDConnectEnglish/Images/PDF/2010Code_Eng_online.pdf. 
 85 EAST CARROLL PARISH SCH. SYST., A COMPACT FOR STUDENT 
SUCCESS/STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE 45-47, available at http://www.e-carrollschools.org/ 
docs/codeofconduct.pdf. 
 86 GUILFORD CNTY. SCH., 2010-2011 STUDENT HANDBOOK 8 (2010), available 
at http://www.gcsnc.com/education/school/school.php?sectionid=33789 (follow “Student 
Handbook” hyperlink). 
 87 NELSON CNTY. PUB. SCH. DIV., STUDENT CONDUCT 2-3 (2011), available at 
http://www.nelson.k12.va.us/District/Policy/Section%20J/JFC.pdf. 
 88 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2911 (2009) (defining crime of “Interference 
with or disruption of an educational institution”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 415.5 (West 
2010) (defining crime of “Disturbance of peace of school, community college, university 
or state university”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 871.01 (West 2000) (defining crime of 
“Disturbing schools and religious and other assemblies”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, 
§ 40 (West 2000) (defining crime of “Disturbance of schools or assemblies”); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 392.910 (2008) (defining as unlawful misdemeanor “Disturbance of 
school”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2003) (defining crime of “Disturbing schools”); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-6 (2004) (defining “Disturbance of school” as a 
misdemeanor); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.123 (West 2006) (defining “Disruptive 
Activities” at a public school as a misdemeanor); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-710 
(LexisNexis 2009) (criminalizing “Disruption of activities in or near school building”); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.635-030 (West 2009) (defining crime of “Disturbing 
school, school activities or meetings”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-14 (LexisNexis 2010) 
(defining crime of “Disturbance of schools”); see also Julius Menacker & Richard Mertz, 
State Legislative Responses to School Crime, 85 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1993) (reviewing 
statutes in thirty-six states relating to school crime specifically).  
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talking back to teachers.89 In 1994, the South Carolina Attorney 
General issued an opinion stating that students who fight in 
school, fail to leave school grounds upon request, or use foul or 
offensive language toward a principal or teacher are subject to 
criminal prosecution.90  
As a result of these policy developments, schoolchildren 
today are more likely to be arrested and prosecuted for school-
based misconduct than they were a generation ago.91 According 
to the Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice, the 
number of referrals to the juvenile justice system for relatively 
minor school-based conduct is on the rise.92 Given this shift 
toward criminalization, the administration of school discipline 
appears to be increasingly adversarial.  
B. Rates of School-Based Referrals to Law Enforcement 
Simply acknowledging that law enforcement intersects 
with school discipline more often than it did in the past does 
not fully resolve the issues posed by current doctrine. Even 
T.L.O. conceded that law enforcement sometimes overlaps with 
school discipline; it concluded, however, that the incidence of 
convergence is sufficiently rare to warrant treating the two 
institutions distinctly. The key issue, then, is the scope of the 
convergence. This section examines empirical studies 
measuring school-based student referrals to law enforcement to 
assess the extent to which school discipline remains discrete 
from law enforcement. A school-based referral to law 
enforcement may take several forms. I use the term “school-
based law enforcement referral” to refer to incidents in which a 
youth is arrested at school or for school-related conduct, which 
sometimes but not always results in the youth being processed 
through the juvenile or criminal court system. It also includes 
incidents in which the youth is not arrested, but is processed 
  
 89 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-507 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-106(a) 
(2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-916 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-303 (2009); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-16 (2003).  
 90 1994 S.C. Op. Att’y Gen. 62 (No 94-25).  
 91 See, e.g., DAVID E. GROSSMANN & MAURICE PORTLEY, NAT’L COUNCIL OF 
JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING 
COURT PRACTICE IN DELINQUENCY CASES 150-51 (2005) (expressing concern over use of 
juvenile court to handle school misconduct); Bob Herbert, School to Prison Pipeline, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2007, at A15; Krezmien et al., supra note 9, at 275; Gara LaMarche, The 
Time Is Right to End “Zero Tolerance” in Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Apr. 6, 2011, at 35. 
 92 FED. ADVISORY COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2010) 
(“[S]chool discipline problems (even minor ones) are increasingly being handled by law 
enforcement rather than by schools.”).  
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through the juvenile or criminal justice systems or is required 
to respond to a criminal citation.  
The analysis draws from several recently published studies. 
None of these studies purports to determine why some schools rely 
on law enforcement to maintain discipline while others do not. A 
wide range of causal factors may be at play, ranging from attitudes 
of school officials to limits on funding for traditional classroom 
management techniques. Determining the underlying causes for 
differing rates of referrals is beyond the scope of this article. 
Rather, this article seeks to provide a descriptive assessment of 
school officials’ reliance on law enforcement.  
The studies examined here differ somewhat in 
methodology and jurisdictions examined. Nonetheless, 
collectively, they provide useful guides to assess the degree of 
intersection between school discipline and law enforcement. 
Specifically, the studies provide data on three important 
indicators, namely: (1) the share of juvenile law enforcement 
referrals that stem from school-based misconduct, (2) the 
number of school-based law enforcement referrals per one 
thousand enrolled students per year, and (3) the types of 
offenses for which students are referred to law enforcement.  
Percentage of law enforcement referrals resulting 
from school-based misconduct: The percentage of youth 
referrals to law enforcement stemming from school-based 
misconduct provides a useful empirical measure of the extent to 
which school discipline and law enforcement converge. A finding 
that school-based referrals represent a large share of the overall 
number of law enforcement referrals would challenge the 
doctrinal view that school discipline is categorically discrete 
from law enforcement. In addition, it would suggest that a 
relatively large share of juvenile arrests and investigations 
occurs without the guarantees of Miranda warnings and 
probable cause, since these protections generally are not 
constitutionally required for school-based investigations.93  
According to a recent assessment of the National 
Incident Based Reporting System, which maintains records of 
crime incidents from 20 percent of the nation’s police agencies, 
approximately one in six (17 percent) juvenile arrests stems 
from school-based misbehavior.94 This figure casts doubt on the 
doctrinal contention that the investigation and punishment of 
  
 93 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
 94 Cook, Gottfredson & Na, supra note 9, at 319, 332.  
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school misconduct categorically differ from investigation and 
punishment for law enforcement purposes.  
Moreover, data from jurisdiction-specific studies suggest 
an extremely high degree of variance across jurisdictions. State-
level data show that the share of juvenile court cases that 
originate from school-based misconduct ranges from a low of 4 
percent to a high of 43 percent.95 These data, limited to formal 
referrals to juvenile court, do not provide a precise measure of 
the share of youth law enforcement referrals that are school-
based. They omit incidents in which a youth is referred to law 
enforcement through an arrest at school, but charges are 
dropped before a case is filed in juvenile court. They also omit 
school-based law enforcement referrals that result in charges 
being filed in adult criminal court rather than in juvenile court.96  
The Annual Report for the North Carolina Department 
of Juvenile Justice indicates that 43 percent (16,140 out of 
37,584) of offenses that result in referral to the juvenile justice 
system are school based.97 A recently published survey by 
education scholar Michael Krezmien and colleagues finds far 
lower rates in the five states for which it was able to obtain 
data: Arizona, Hawaii, Missouri, South Carolina, and West 
Virginia.98 Among those states, West Virginia exhibited the 
highest share of court referrals that were school based, with 
approximately 17 percent of juvenile cases originating in 
schools, while Hawaii exhibited the lowest share, with only 4 
percent originating in schools.99 While it is not clear that the 
North Carolina report and the multistate study employed a 
sufficiently similar methodology to permit precise comparison, 
the results of the two reports suggest wide variance across 
states in the extent to which law enforcement is used to 
maintain school order.100  
  
 95 See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.  
 96 The number of school-based law enforcement referrals that result in 
charges being filed in adult criminal court is likely to be particularly large in 
jurisdictions such as North Carolina, where youth aged sixteen or older are 
automatically processed through the adult criminal courts, regardless of the offense. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1604 (West 2004). 
 97 N.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, ANNUAL 
REPORT 21 (2010), available at http://www.ncdjjdp.org/resources/pdf_documents/annual_ 
report_2010.pdf. 
 98 Krezmien et al., supra note 9, at 283.  
 99 See id.  
 100 Similarly, according to a recent study by the Council for State Governments, 
only 6 percent of youth referrals to the juvenile court system in Texas (5349 out of 85,548 
formal referrals) came directly from schools. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR. & 
PUB. POLICY RESEARCH INST., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW 
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A study of county-level data in Florida suggests that even 
within a given state, the extent to which law enforcement 
converges with school discipline varies considerably.101 According to 
the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, the statewide share of 
juvenile court referrals that stem from conduct on public school 
grounds, at a school bus stop, or at a school event is approximately 
15 percent.102 The rates for individual counties, however, diverge 
significantly from this baseline. In Gulf and Dixie Counties the 
percentage of delinquency referrals for school-based misconduct 
was only 8 percent, while in other counties more than a quarter of 
delinquency cases came from schools: Okeechobee (29 percent), St. 
Lucie (27 percent), Hamilton (27 percent), Jackson (26 percent), 
and Marion Counties (26 percent).103 Again, these data are limited 
to cases resulting in a referral to juvenile court; they omit cases in 
which students are arrested but released before juvenile court 
charges are filed, and they omit cases in which youth are 
processed through the adult criminal justice system.104  
Although differences in methodology across the studies 
limit to some degree the comparability of these data, the studies 
suggest that school discipline practices vary widely across 
jurisdictions. At the low end, in some jurisdictions as few as 4 
percent of juvenile court cases may originate in schools; at the high 
end, as many as 43 percent may originate from schools.105 
Nonetheless, the data demonstrate that in at least some 
jurisdictions it has become difficult to defend the claim that school 
discipline differs categorically from law enforcement, or that school 
discipline serves educational rather than police purposes. The 
heavy reliance on law enforcement to maintain school order 
suggests that one can no longer assume a nonadversarial, 
benevolent relationship between school disciplinarian and student.  
  
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 
INVOLVEMENT xii n.2 (2011) [hereinafter BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES], available at 
http://justicecenter.csg.org/resources/juveniles. This figure likely understates the actual 
rate of law enforcement referral by schools because it appears to exclude incidents in 
which a police officer who is summoned to the school is the one to formally file a 
delinquency petition, a student is arrested at school but subsequently released without 
the filing of a juvenile court petition, or a student is processed through municipal rather 
than juvenile court. 
 101 FLA. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR PROGRAM ACCOUNTABILITY, 
DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS: A SIX-YEAR STUDY (2010) [hereinafter 
DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS], available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/research/ 
School_Referrals/FY-2009-10-Delinquency-in-Schools-Analysis.pdf. 
 102 In absolute numbers, the data show that there were 18,467 school-related 
delinquency referrals, out of a total 121,689 delinquency referrals statewide. Id. at 3.  
 103 Id. at 4. 
 104 Id. at 2. 
 105 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.  
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Number of school-based law enforcement referrals 
per one thousand enrolled students per year: Data showing 
rates of school-based law enforcement referrals per one thousand 
students per year likewise permit an evaluation of the claim 
that school discipline differs categorically from law enforcement. 
Where the rates of school-based arrest and referral are relatively 
high, the claim that the investigation and punishment of school 
misconduct furthers educational rather than law enforcement 
purposes becomes harder to defend. A number of recently 
published studies provide data on this measure. These data 
show that, as with the proportion of juvenile court referrals 
stemming from school-based misconduct, rates of school-based 
law enforcement referrals per one thousand enrolled students 
vary significantly across jurisdictions.106  
The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice’s Annual 
Report calculates the number of school-related delinquency 
referrals per one thousand students enrolled in grades six 
through twelve; statewide, there were thirteen (13) school-
related delinquency referrals per one thousand middle and 
high school students.107 Rates of school-based delinquency 
referrals varied dramatically across counties within Florida, 
though, from a low of only four (4) school-related delinquency 
referrals per one thousand students in Lafayette and Nassau 
Counties, to a high of forty-two (42) and fifty (50) referrals per 
one thousand students in Hamilton and Putnam Counties, 
respectively.108 These figures understate the actual incidence of 
school-based law enforcement referral because they omit 
instances in which a student is arrested at school but released 
before charges are filed in juvenile court, and they omit cases 
referred to adult criminal court.  
Even greater variability exists in Texas. The advocacy 
organization Texas Appleseed recently published its analysis of 
rates of school-based arrests in seventeen districts where data 
  
 106 These figures do not purport to estimate the likelihood that a given student 
will be subject to school-based law enforcement, because some students may have been 
referred to law enforcement more than once. 
 107 DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS, supra note 101, at 5. 
 108 The multistate study found a smaller range, from a low of two (2) school-
based juvenile court cases per one thousand students enrolled in Hawaii, to a high of 
nine (9) cases per one thousand students in Missouri. These data, which unlike the 
Florida report include elementary school students, understate the arrest rate for 
middle and high school students who are arrested at higher rates than their younger 
counterparts. Krezmien, supra note 9, at 278. 
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were available.109 The study, analyzing data from seventeen 
districts representing 13 percent of the state’s student body, 
found that at the low end of the spectrum there were one-and-a-
half (1.5) and two (2) school-based arrests per one thousand 
enrolled students in Castleberry and Wichita Falls districts, 
respectively.110 At the high end of the spectrum, East Central 
reported fifty-one (51) arrests for every one thousand students.111 
These data also understate the actual incidence of school-based 
law enforcement referral, as they omit instances in which a 
student is referred to juvenile court without being arrested at 
school, such as when the student receives a summons to appear 
in lieu of arrest. Unlike the figures for Florida, these figures 
include elementary school students as well as middle and high 
school students; had the data excluded elementary school 
students, rates of school-based arrests per one-thousand enrolled 
middle and high school students would be higher.112  
The Texas Appleseed study also provides data on the 
issuance of misdemeanor tickets in public schools.113 These 
citations require the recipient to appear in municipal court and 
may result in fines of up to $500; a failure to appear subjects 
the individual to a bench warrant for arrest.114 Data from the 
twenty-six districts for which data were available again show 
wide disparities in the administration of punishment.115 At the 
lower end of the scale, United and Humble districts each issued 
fourteen (14) criminal citations per one thousand enrolled 
students,116 while at the high end, Galveston issued 109 
citations per one thousand enrolled students.117 In Texas alone, 
then, there are as few as one-and-a-half (1.5) to as many as 
fifty-one (51) school-based arrests per one thousand enrolled 
  
 109 TEX. APPLESEED, TEXAS’ SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: TICKETING, ARREST 
AND USE OF FORCE IN SCHOOLS 101 (2010) [hereinafter TEXAS APPLESEED], available at 
http://www.texasappleseed.net/images/stories/reports/Ticketing_Booklet_web.pdf. 
 110 Id. at 104-05. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 114 (documenting data showing that majority of school-based arrests 
are for high school students).  
 113 Id. at 67-96. 
 114 Id. at 69.  
 115 Id. at 67-96.  
 116 Id. at 77-78 (indicating 522 tickets issued in United Independent School 
District, which enrolls 37,671 students, and 431 tickets issued in Humble Independent 
School District, which enrolls 31,144 students).  
 117 Id. at 77 (indicating 921 tickets issued in the Galveston Independent 
School District, which enrolls 8,430 students). 
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students, and as few as fourteen (14) and as many as 109 
misdemeanor citations per one thousand of these students.118  
Types of behaviors for which students are subject to 
law enforcement referral: An examination of the types of 
behaviors for which students are referred to law enforcement 
provides another useful indicator to evaluate the factual 
supposition that school discipline differs categorically from the 
criminal process. Where law enforcement is being deployed to 
address student behavior that traditionally would have been 
handled more informally—through the imposition of after-school 
detention or suspension—the resulting adversarial relationship 
belies the claim that the intervention pedagogically benefits the 
punished student.  
The South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice’s 
Annual Report indicates that “disturbance of schools” 
represents the single most frequent offense resulting in a 
referral to juvenile court.119 Conduct resulting in a charge of 
“disturbance of schools” may not amount to conduct that would 
result in an assault charge or other more serious offenses. 
These data indicate that South Carolina schools heavily rely on 
law enforcement and juvenile courts to handle conduct that 
would not amount to a crime outside of the school context.  
According to the Florida Department of Juvenile 
Justice, two-thirds of all school-related delinquency referrals 
involved misdemeanors, while one-third involved felonies.120 
Misdemeanor assault and battery and disorderly conduct 
violations represented the largest segment of school-based 
delinquency referrals, at 21 percent and 15 percent, 
respectively.121 Weapons offenses counted for approximately 5 
percent of all school-related delinquency referrals.122 
The Texas Appleseed study found that among the 
twenty-two districts that disaggregated criminal citations by 
offense, more than half the tickets were for disorderly conduct 
(e.g., profanity, offensive gesture, or fighting) or disruption of 
class or transportation.123 An additional 10 percent of the tickets 
  
 118 See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.  
 119 S.C. DEP’T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 2009-2010 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 
4 (2010), available at http://www.state.sc.us/djj/pdfs/2010%20Annual%20Statistical% 
20Report.pdf.  
 120 DELINQUENCY IN FLORIDA’S SCHOOLS, supra note 101, at 8. 
 121 Id.  
 122 Id.  
 123 TEXAS APPLESEED, supra note 109, at 82. 
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were for violations of curfew or the Student Code of Conduct.124 
Among the eleven school districts that disaggregated data on 
school-based arrests by offense, 24 percent of school-based 
arrests were for disorderly conduct125 
Anecdotal newspaper accounts provide further 
corroboration that some schools rely on police to handle 
relatively minor forms of student misbehavior. In Lucas 
County, Ohio, the majority of school-related referrals to 
juvenile court were for disruptive conduct, while only 
approximately 2 percent were for more serious incidents such 
as assaulting a teacher or taking a gun to school.126 In Lafayette 
Parish, Louisiana, 46 percent of school-based arrests were for 
disturbing the peace or simple assault or battery, while 4 
percent were for weapons or drug offenses.127 According to the 
presiding family court judge in Birmingham, Alabama, only 
approximately 7 percent of school-based arrests involved 
offenses that actually warranted arrest, such as weapons 
offenses or other felonies.128 In some jurisdictions, then, school 
officials appear to have delegated their traditional authority to 
handle common forms of student misconduct—such as those 
involving disruptive behavior or fights—to law enforcement.  
Data from these studies suggest that in some, but not 
all, jurisdictions it has become more difficult to claim that 
students accused of misconduct are investigated and punished 
for their own educational benefit, or that efforts to maintain 
school order are justified by pedagogical goals, not law 
enforcement ones. Rather, at the high end of the range, up to 
43 percent of youth referrals to law enforcement involve school 
misconduct, and there are up to fifty (50) school-based referrals 
to juvenile court, fifty-one (51) school-based arrests, and 109 
criminal citations for every one thousand students enrolled in 
public schools per year.129 Nonetheless, these figures are not 
typical of all jurisdictions. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, as few 
as 4 percent of juvenile court cases stem from school 
  
 124 Id.  
 125 Id. at 107. 
 126 Sara Rimer, Unruly Students Facing Arrest, Not Detention, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 4, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/04/us/unruly-students-
facing-arrest-not-detention.html?%20pagewanted=al&src=pm. 
 127 Marsha Sills, Parish Schools See Reduced Violence, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., 
May 30, 2009, at B1.  
 128 Marie Leech & Carol Robinson, Birmingham City Schools Rely on Arrests to 
Keep Order, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Mar. 22, 2009, 6:19 AM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/ 
2009/03/city_schools_rely_on_arrests_t.html. 
 129 See supra notes 97, 109, 113, 119 and accompanying text. 
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misconduct, and there may only be four (4) school-based court 
referrals, one (1) or two (2) school-based arrests, and fourteen 
(14) criminal citations per one thousand students per year.130  
C. Educational Impact of Law Enforcement Referrals 
The increasing reliance on law enforcement referrals to 
maintain school order challenges the assumption that school 
discipline furthers educational interests. Whatever might be 
said about the pedagogical value of suspensions or other more 
traditional forms of school discipline, the available social 
science shows that referring a student to law enforcement has 
  
 130 See supra notes 100, 109, 111, 118 and accompanying text. An examination 
of the causes for these disparities is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is 
worth noting that the disparities are not entirely randomized. As sociologist Paul 
Hirschfield has observed, “criminalization in middle class schools is less intense and 
more fluid than in the inner-city, where proximate or immediate crime threats are 
overriding concerns.” Hirschfield, supra note 9, at 84; see also Maureen Carroll, 
Comment, Educating Expelled Students After No Child Left Behind: Mending an 
Incentive Structure that Discourages Alternative Education and Reinstatement, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1909, 1934-37 (2008) (discussing racial disparities and discrimination in 
school discipline); Heather Cobb, Separate and Unequal: The Disparate Impact of 
School-Based Referrals to Juvenile Court, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 581 (2009) 
(same); Elizabeth E. Hall, Criminalizing Our Youth: The School-to-Prison Pipeline v. 
the Constitution, 4 S. REG’L BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 75 (2010) (same). A 
qualitative study conducting interviews with law enforcement officers deployed to 
public schools across Massachusetts concluded that larger, urban school districts rely on 
arrests to maintain school discipline more heavily than suburban and rural school 
districts; officers stated that in urban school districts, school officials prioritized sending a 
“get tough” message, while those in affluent suburban schools with predominantly white 
populations prioritized preserving the reputation of their students and the school. Thurau 
& Wald, supra note 8, at 988, 1010. Given the disproportionate representation of minority 
students in urban schools, it may come as no surprise that students of color bear the 
brunt of the trend toward increased criminalization. According to the multistate study 
described in the text, the likelihood of school-based law enforcement referrals for Latino 
students in Arizona is three times higher than for white students; the rate for black 
students is twice as high as for white students. Krezmien et al., supra note 9, at 14. The 
Advancement Project reports similar trends, finding that black youth are more than two 
times more likely to be referred to law enforcement at school than white students in 
Colorado, two-and-a-half times more likely in Florida, and three-and-a-half times more 
likely in Philadelphia. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW 
“ZERO TOLERANCE” AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-
PRISON PIPELINE 19 (2010), available at http://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/ 
files/publications/rev_fin.pdf. Moreover, a report by the American Civil Liberties Union 
suggests these racial disparities cannot be blamed exclusively on differences across 
school districts or differences in students’ behavior. It found that black students 
involved in physical altercations are twice as likely to be arrested at school in the same 
district as white students who commit the same acts; likewise, black and Latino 
students who commit drug offenses at school are ten times more likely to be arrested 
than white students who commit drug offenses in the same district. ACLU, HARD 
LESSONS: SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS AND SCHOOL-BASED ARRESTS IN 
THREE CONNECTICUT TOWNS 26 (2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/ 
racialjustice/hardlessons_november2008.pdf.  
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negative educational consequences not only on the youth 
referred, but also likely on the larger student body.  
1. Educational Impact on the Punished Student 
Behavioral theories posit three competing models of the 
relationship between harsh punishments and youth outcomes: 
deterrence theory, propensity theory, and labeling theory.131 
Deterrence theory, as its name suggests, posits that formal 
behavioral interventions deter youth from future deviant 
behavior. Propensity theory suggests that harsh punishments 
neither encourage nor discourage future deviant conduct; any 
relationship between the punishment and future behavior is 
correlative rather than causative, because the same inherent 
traits that led to the first instance of misconduct will lead to 
future deviance. Conversely, labeling theory suggests that harsh 
punishments for youth will actually increase future misconduct 
by labeling the youth as a deviant and creating a deviant self-
concept with potentially life-altering consequences; others may 
also come to identify the youth as a deviant, thereby foreclosing 
opportunities that would otherwise have been available. Among 
the three competing theories, only deterrence theory supports 
the doctrinal assumption that punitive forms of school discipline 
such as a school-based arrest or law enforcement referral further 
the educational interests of the punished youth.  
In fact, the available empirical evidence lends no 
support for the deterrence theory with respect to law 
enforcement referrals for school-based offenses. On the 
contrary, social science consistently shows that a law 
enforcement referral has significant negative consequences on 
youth educational outcomes. Among the more recent research, 
a 2006 study by criminologist Gary Sweeten assessed the 
relationship between law enforcement referral and educational 
attainment. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth, a nationally representative sample, the study found 
that a first-time arrest during high school years nearly doubles 
the likelihood of dropping out of high school; an arrest coupled 
with a court appearance quadruples the likelihood.132 The 
magnitude of this effect holds, even after controlling for other 
factors thought to influence dropout rates including being held 
  
 131 See Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School 
Education by Arrest and Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462, 463 (2006).  
 132 Id. at 473.  
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back a grade, living in a single-parent household, poor prior 
academic performance, and rates of delinquent conduct.133 
Similarly, a 2009 study by sociologist Paul Hirschfield assessed 
the impact of a first-time arrest on high school dropout rates in 
Chicago.134 Drawing a sample of students in Chicago Public 
Schools with high concentrations of low-income and minority 
students, it found that those who were arrested in ninth or 
tenth grade were six to eight times more likely to drop out of 
high school as classmates who were not arrested, even after 
controlling for variables including prior delinquency, peer 
delinquency, truancy, academic achievement, and anger 
control.135 A number of other studies have drawn similar 
conclusions regarding the negative impact of arrest on high 
school graduation rates.136  
None of these studies specifically examines the impact 
of an arrest when it occurs on school grounds or for school-
related conduct. Yet, there is no reason to think that the 
negative educational impact of school-based arrest would be 
any less than the negative educational impact of arrest 
generally. On the contrary, given the importance of school 
officials and students maintaining positive relationships, one 
would expect that the negative impact of an arrest would be 
exacerbated when the arrest occurs at school. Further research 
should be conducted on this question. Nonetheless, in light of 
the findings to date, the use of school-based law enforcement 
referrals cannot currently be defended on the ground that it 
educationally benefits the referred youth.  
2. Educational Impact on Other Students 
Moreover, there is little empirical support for the claim 
that the use of law enforcement to maintain school order 
accrues educational benefits to the larger student population. 
It may well be true that if one student persistently disrupts the 
classroom, removal of that student enhances the remaining 
students’ ability to learn.137 However, there is no evidence 
  
 133 Id. at 478.  
 134 Paul Hirschfield, Another Way Out: The Impact of Juvenile Arrests on High 
School Dropout, 82 SOC. OF EDUC. 368, 369 (2009).  
 135 Id. at 368.  
 136 Id. at 370.  
 137 See Cook et al., supra note 9, at 372 (“Clearly, removing troublemakers 
from school helps maintain an environment more suitable for learning for the 
remaining students.”).  
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suggesting that referring the student to law enforcement 
specifically⎯in lieu of or in addition to some other mechanism 
such as traditional suspension⎯improves the educational 
climate for the remaining students. Indeed, a recent meta-
analysis of 178 individual studies assessing the effectiveness of 
different school-based disciplinary interventions found no 
evidence that the use of arrest and juvenile courts to handle 
school disorder reduces the occurrence of problem behavior in 
schools.138 Some scholars have reasoned that, by creating 
adversarial and distrustful relationships between law 
enforcement and school authorities on the one hand, and the 
student body on the other, coercive police-like interventions may 
actually increase school disorder. Education scholars Matthew 
Mayer and Peter Leone analyzed data from the National Crime 
Victimization Survey to assess the relationship between coercive 
school security measures and educational climate and found that 
restrictive measures such as the use of security personnel, metal 
detectors, and locker searches were not only associated with 
higher levels of school disorder, but also possibly caused that 
disorder. Based on these findings they concluded, “creating an 
unwelcoming, almost jail-like, heavily scrutinized environment, 
may foster the violence and disorder school administrators hope 
to avoid.”139 Similarly, one criminologist recently expressed 
concern that “aggressive security measures produce alienation 
and mistrust among students” and such measures “can disrupt 
the learning environment and create an adversarial relationship 
between school officials and students,”140 while another 
criminologist suggested that the use of aggressive law 
enforcement tactics in schools “may cause students to distrust 
educational and law enforcement authorities which could 
motivate students to engage in greater delinquency.”141 Far from 
suggesting that law enforcement referrals improve the 
educational climate for remaining students, the limited evidence 
to date has led experts to conclude that such referrals likely 
compromise educational goals.  
The primary doctrinal justifications for restricting the 
procedural rights of youth when they are investigated or 
  
 138 See id. at 369.  
 139 Matthew J. Mayer & Peter E. Leone, A Structural Analysis of School 
Violence and Disruption: Implications for Creating Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. & 
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 333, 349 (1999). 
 140 Randall R. Beger, The Worst of Both Worlds, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 340 (2003). 
 141 Brown, supra note 9, at 599.  
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punished for misconduct⎯that such investigations and 
punishments serve the youth’s educational interests and that 
they differ categorically from law enforcement⎯prove 
considerably less persuasive in light of evidence of 
contemporary school discipline practices and their likely 
educational impact on students. Whatever might be said about 
the more traditional school discipline practices of suspension or 
paddling, it can hardly be argued that school-based arrest is “a 
valuable educational device”142 or has “long been an accepted 
method of promoting good behavior and instilling notions of 
responsibility . . . into the mischievous heads of school 
children.”143 In jurisdictions where school officials frequently 
remove students from schools through formal arrest or the 
filing of a delinquency petition, one can no longer claim that 
the interests of the investigating school official and the student 
are aligned rather than adversarial. The next part explores the 
implications of these findings.  
III. INCORPORATING CONSIDERATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL 
IMPACT OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE  
The developing body of empirical evidence in the 
preceding part challenges the doctrinal justification for denying 
procedural protections to youth who are accused of misconduct 
in schools. To the extent school discipline increasingly takes the 
form of law enforcement referrals, it can no longer be justified by 
the educational benefits it confers on the child or its purportedly 
nonadversarial nature. Those rationales for insulating 
traditional forms of school discipline from constitutional 
protections simply no longer apply in jurisdictions that rely on 
law enforcement to maintain order in schools.  
Changes in the operation of school discipline parallel 
the evolution of the juvenile justice system decades ago. Until 
the 1960s, youth in juvenile court were denied the 
constitutional procedural protections afforded to adults in 
criminal court on the ground that the juvenile court, unlike the 
adult criminal court, was assumed to act in a nonadversarial 
manner in furtherance of the accused youth’s interests—to 
rehabilitate rather than punish the youth.144 By the 1960s, 
  
 142 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).  
 143 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659 (1977). 
 144 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967) (“[I]t is urged that the juvenile 
benefits from informal proceedings in the court. The early conception of the Juvenile 
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however, emerging social science evidence on actual juvenile 
court practices and their impact on the emotional and social 
development of youth cast doubt on those earlier premises:  
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of 
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious 
questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough 
against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the 
process from the reach of constitutional guarantees available to 
adults.145  
The Supreme Court reasoned that “neither sentiment nor 
folklore should cause us to shut our eyes” to these studies.146 
Evaluating this evidence, it concluded first in Kent v. United 
States that juveniles had the “worst of both worlds”—neither 
the nurturing benefit of a nonadversarial system, nor the 
procedural protections of adult criminal court.147 One year later, 
in In re Gault, it found that “[t]he rhetoric of the juvenile court 
movement has developed without any necessarily close 
correspondence to the realities of court and institutional 
routines.”148 In light of empirical developments, the Court 
reversed decades of precedent to extend to juveniles many of 
the constitutional procedural protections previously reserved 
for individuals in the adult criminal system.  
Similarly, recent empirical evidence suggests that 
school discipline practices may no longer advance the 
beneficent, nonadversarial goals that once insulated them from 
ordinary judicial scrutiny. In light of the growing divergence 
between stated goals and actual practices in school discipline, 
courts should reconsider the validity of doctrinal restrictions on 
procedural rights in the school discipline context, just as the 
Supreme Court did for juvenile courts in Gault. This part sets 
forth a framework for courts to do so. In addition, it discusses 
the potential role of nonjudicial actors in reform efforts. 
  
Court proceeding was one in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of 
the erring youth by talking over his problems, by paternal advice and 
admonition . . . .”). 
 145 Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 554-56 (1966). 
 146 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21. 
 147 383 U.S. at 556. 
 148 387 U.S. at 30 (citation omitted). 
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A. A Context-Specific Approach to Procedural Protections in 
Courts 
In light of the empirical evidence showing an increased 
reliance on law enforcement to maintain public school order and 
the educational harms associated with this increased reliance, 
courts should critically evaluate the operation of school 
discipline to ensure that it actually advances the educational 
interests that previously justified insulating school discipline 
from closer judicial scrutiny.149 Given how significantly school 
discipline practices vary across jurisdictions, however, this 
analysis should be location-specific.150  
The framework proposed here preserves the presumption 
that school discipline generally serves pedagogical goals, but 
permits the youth to rebut this presumption by showing that 
discipline practices in the youth’s particular school or district do 
not further educational interests. Relevant evidence might 
include, for example, data showing high rates of school-based 
arrests in the school or district, the frequent use of school-based 
arrests to handle relatively minor misconduct, or expert 
testimony regarding the educational impact of particular 
disciplinary practices employed in the school or district.  
Reviewing this evidence, the court would render an 
interpretive judgment as to whether the particular discipline 
practices in a school or district primarily further a law 
enforcement goal rather than an educational one. Where the 
court finds the evidence persuasive, investigations of student 
misconduct would be presumed adversarial and thus subject to 
the full scope of constitutional protections that would be 
available to youth outside of the school context. By contrast, 
where school discipline practices adhere to the traditional model 
of discipline furthering pedagogical goals, doctrinal restrictions 
on constitutional rights would remain in place. Thus, the 
availability of procedural protections for youth in public schools 
would depend on a jurisdiction-specific assessment, rather than 
a categorical assumption, of the educational benefit of school 
  
 149 See Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 254, 310-11 (2011) (critiquing current “one-size-permits-everything” categorical 
approach to administrative searches such as those conducted in public schools).  
 150 See also Anthony V. Alfieri, Post-Racialism in the Inner City: Structure and 
Culture in Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 921, 959-60 (2010) (urging development of “local, 
school-specific fact investigation” to examine impact of school-based law enforcement 
referrals on youth). 
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discipline practices. This framework ensures that the education 
of youth is the paramount interest served.  
There are a number of potential objections to this 
contextualized approach. First, one might argue that even if 
school discipline no longer serves the student’s educational 
interests, procedural rights should remain limited to protect the 
interests of other students. Second, a critic might contend that 
even though jurisdictions differ in their reliance on law 
enforcement, a categorical rule that assumes that school 
discipline always furthers the educational interests of youth is 
preferable because it is easier to administer. Third, one might 
argue that a better approach would be to employ an 
individualized analysis to determine whether the investigation 
of misconduct in a particular case furthers educational goals. 
Fourth, one might object to this type of contextualized rule on 
the ground that it would improperly result in constitutional 
protections varying by geography (e.g., probable cause required 
for searches in schools in district A, but not in district B). Fifth 
and finally, the framework is subject to the criticism that courts 
should not be in the business of second-guessing the educational 
value of school discipline. This section addresses each in turn.  
Rejecting reliance on the interests of other students. 
One might argue that even if the relationship between 
investigating official and accused student is recognized as 
adversarial and in service of law enforcement, procedural 
restrictions may remain warranted because the interests of the 
individual student are outweighed by the countervailing 
interests of other students in learning without disruption.151 The 
Supreme Court has noted this concern about preserving the 
rights of other students in some cases.152 This view does not 
necessarily hold that the ordinary calculus weighing individual 
interests against collective interests does not apply, but rather 
that the collective interest in school order weighs so heavily as to 
overcome the competing individual student’s interest in securing 
the full scope of procedural protections.  
  
 151 See Ryan, supra note 6, at 1341, 1411-14 (interpreting limits on 
constitutional rights in school discipline cases as resting on the view that they are 
necessary to “preserve an atmosphere that is safe and conducive to learning” and “to 
maintain discipline in order to transmit academic knowledge”); see also Tribe, supra 
note 7, at 314 n.128 (“[E]ven if in general the teachers’ and child’s interest truly 
converge, at the moment of suspension convergence must surely turn into clash: the 
teacher is saying that the best interests of other students will be served by this 
particular student’s suspension.”). 
 152 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. 
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As a purely doctrinal matter, this approach is not 
entirely satisfactory. Relying on the interests of other students 
fails to articulate why the collective interest in school order 
should outweigh the collective interest in, say, reducing violent 
crimes in neighborhoods. It sets up the same tension between 
individual interests and collective interests that exists for all 
criminal procedural protections. Perhaps for this reason, the 
Court has never relied exclusively on this rationale, instead 
using it to buttress its primary rationale—that the collective 
interests and the individual student’s interests are aligned.  
Moreover, as an empirical matter, there is little 
evidentiary support in the literature for the claim that the use of 
law enforcement, rather than other forms of discipline, in fact 
advances the educational interests of other students. On the 
contrary, as set forth in the preceding part, social scientists from 
related disciplines in education, criminology, and sociology 
suggest that heavy reliance on policing measures in public 
schools generates an adversarial atmosphere that may 
compromise the educational environment for all students.153  
Rejecting a categorical rule. The proposed context-
specific approach to determining the scope of procedural rights is 
preferable to an alternative categorical regime notwithstanding 
concerns of administrability. Concededly, the current categorical 
rule that exempts school searches from probable cause 
requirements and presumes school officials are not agents of the 
police for Miranda purposes is easy for courts to apply 
consistently; courts and litigants are not required to engage in a 
potentially costly fact-specific assessment of actual school 
discipline practices.154 A defense of the current categorical rule 
might reason that schools in general continue to use school 
discipline to further educational interests, even if some schools 
depart from this norm; thus, the factual premise on which the 
doctrinal restrictions rest⎯that school discipline and law 
enforcement generally remain discrete⎯remains accurate most 
of the time.  
Such reliance on generalities is explicitly permissible 
pursuant to the Mathews v. Eldridge framework for 
determining procedural rights in the civil context, which 
assesses the risk of error associated with the denial of 
  
 153 See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. 
 154 See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking 
Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38-41 (1994) (describing 
normative reasons for preferring nationally uniform legal rules).  
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procedural protections in the “generality of cases, not the rare 
exceptions.”155 Under this view, restrictions on procedural rights 
are warranted so long as school discipline “generally” is 
discrete from law enforcement, and disciplinarians “rarely” 
stand in an adversarial position vis a vis students.  
The increasing availability of relevant data mitigates 
this concern about administrability. Federal agencies have 
amended the biannual federal Civil Rights Data Collection to 
require school districts to maintain and publicly report data on 
the total number of student referrals to law enforcement and 
the total number of school-related arrests for each school.156 
These mandatory data-collection and reporting requirements 
reduce the litigation costs associated with obtaining and 
analyzing this information.  
More importantly, the primary purpose of uniform, 
categorical rules is to ensure that “similarly situated litigants 
are treated equally.”157 Where the facts show that litigants are 
not, in fact, similarly situated in a legally significant way, the 
application of the same rule to them is no longer appropriate.158 
In addition, reliance on generalities in the name of efficiency is 
inappropriate where, as here, criminal—as opposed to civil—
procedures are implicated.159 As Jerry L. Mashaw has pointed 
  
 155 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 344 (1976) (stating that 
determination of what process is due in the administrative context requires balancing 
of three factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.”); see, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (applying Mathews 
framework to determine procedural due process rights to challenge school suspension); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977) (same for corporal punishment); Doe ex 
rel. Doe v. Todd Cnty. Sch. Dist., 625 F.3d 459, 462-64 (8th Cir. 2010) (same for 
placement in an alternative high school setting); Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 242 
F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (same for expulsion); Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 
95 (3d Cir. 1989) (same for suspension from interscholastic athletics); Newsome v. 
Batavia Local Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 923-24 (6th Cir. 1988) (same for expulsion); In 
re Expulsion of E.J.W. from Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 500, 632 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001) (same); Hinds Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. R.B. ex rel. D.L.B., 10 So. 3d 
387, 399-402 (Miss. 2008) (same). 
 156 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2009-10 CIVIL RIGHTS 
DATA COLLECTION, OMB 1875-0240 (on file with author).  
 157 See Caminker, supra note 154, at 39-40. 
 158 See generally Alexes Harris, Diverting and Abdicating Judicial Discretion: 
Cultural, Political, and Procedural Dynamics in California Juvenile Justice, 41 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 387 (2007) (discussing competing values of predictability and uniformity 
while describing tension between individual justice versus equal justice).  
 159 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (rejecting applicability of 
Mathews balancing framework for criminal procedural rights). But see Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527-28 (2004). 
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out, criminal procedural rules prohibit coerced confessions not 
because they will yield inaccurate conclusions about 
guilt⎯indeed, they are often all too accurate⎯but rather 
because such confessions offend our basic sense of personal 
autonomy.160 Our juvenile and criminal justice systems require 
a more granular assessment of facts than the current 
categorical rule provides.  
Rejecting an individualized rule. In light of the need 
for a more granular rule, one might argue in favor of an 
individualized case-by-case assessment of whether procedural 
rules should be extended to a particular student, instead of the 
jurisdiction-specific rule proposed here. This alternative approach 
might determine procedural rules depending on, for example, 
whether a school resource officer was present or participated in 
the particular search or questioning, or the subjective intent of 
the school official in conducting the search or questioning.  
This individualized alternative, however, would not be 
workable. The presence or absence of a school resource officer 
does not indicate whether a search or questioning was carried 
out for law enforcement purposes. One recent study found that 
the presence of school resource officers was not correlated with 
the number of school-based arrests in a school.161 The particular 
roles played by school resource officers differ significantly across 
schools. In some schools they are charged with enforcement of 
criminal laws, while in others they focus on mentoring, 
counseling, and teaching.162 Because of this variability in roles, 
school resource officers cannot neatly be categorized as law 
enforcement or school official. The better approach to determine 
whether school investigations serve law enforcement purposes is 
one that examines aggregate data of rates of law enforcement 
referrals in the particular school or district.  
Nor would it be desirable for a court to attempt to discern 
the subjective intent of individual school officials to determine 
  
 160 Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary 
Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 904-05 (1981) (arguing that due process seeks to protect 
dignitary value in privacy in the prohibition against coerced confessions and 
unreasonable searches); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 
455, 481 (1986) (suggesting core value of efficiency embodied in Mathews balancing test 
differs from prior core due process value of fairness). 
 161 Theriot, supra note 9, at 284-85 (finding that the presence of school 
resource officers does not predict more total arrests, but does predict more arrests for 
disorderly conduct).  
 162 PETER FINN & JACK MCDEVITT, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF SCHOOL 
RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS 43 (2005).  
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whether a particular search or interrogation was for law 
enforcement purposes; this approach would present significant 
evidentiary difficulties and potentially encourage false 
statements from school officials. More importantly, such an 
individualized rule would chill school principals, who might feel 
pressured to provide Miranda warnings any time they 
questioned a student about anything—even about not having a 
hall pass—in case the student responded with incriminating 
statements that might subsequently be excluded from court 
because of a Miranda violation. The context-specific rule, by 
contrast, would encourage school officials to provide procedural 
protections only in schools or districts that routinely rely on law 
enforcement, and not in those schools or districts that do not.  
Accepting geographically contingent rules. A 
fourth objection would challenge the proposed context-specific 
rule because it would result in constitutional protections 
varying by geography: probable cause and Miranda warnings 
would be required for student investigations in district A, but 
not in district B. There is precedent for these location-specific 
constitutional protections, however.  
In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the question of whether flight from the police provides 
reasonable suspicion to justify a stop-and-frisk depends on 
background facts regarding the particular area⎯specifically, 
the level of crime in that particular area.163 Here, courts would 
employ a similar approach to reject the categorical rule denying 
procedural protections in schools and instead determine the 
entitlement to such protections based on the background facts 
of student criminalization in the particular school or district. In 
those schools or districts in which law enforcement goals were 
shown to predominate over educational ones, courts would 
demand probable cause and Miranda warnings for school-
based investigations.164  
Accepting educational assessments by courts: Finally, 
one might object to the proposed context-specific approach on the 
ground that courts should not be in the business of second-
  
 163 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 164 See also Livingston, supra note 7, at 286 (arguing that courts should 
consider “character and social meaning” of encounters between officers and individuals 
to determine whether the encounter furthers ordinary law enforcement goals and 
should thus be subject to ordinary criminal procedural protections, or whether, instead, 
the encounter lacks the adversarial relationship characteristic of law enforcement 
encounters and should thus benefit from more relaxed procedural protections).  
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guessing the decisions of school officials.165 As the Supreme Court 
emphasized in the student speech case Hazelwood School District 
v. Kuhlmeier, “the education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the 
responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school 
officials, and not of federal judges.”166  
Notwithstanding the deference afforded to school 
officials, however, the Kuhlmeier decision affirmed the propriety 
of judicial scrutiny over the educational value of school officials’ 
decisions. In Kuhlmeier, which involved censorship of a high 
school newspaper published by students in a journalism class, 
the Court held that even in the context of classroom activities, 
where the deference afforded to school officials is greatest, it 
would review a school official’s conduct to determine whether it 
is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”167 If 
courts are trusted with reviewing the educational goals of in-
classroom decisions in the First Amendment context⎯albeit 
pursuant to a forgiving standard of review⎯it is difficult to 
understand why they should not be trusted with determining 
whether particular discipline practices further educational goals 
in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts, which involve the 
procedural rights of criminal suspects, an area in which courts 
have particular expertise.168  
B. The Role of Nonjudicial Actors in Preserving the 
Educational Value of School Discipline 
Ultimately, courts have limited authority in shaping 
school discipline. They may determine which procedural 
protections will extend to youth who are investigated or 
punished at school, but they lack the authority to determine 
what kind of conduct warrants punishment, and what kind of 
punishment should be imposed. They are poorly situated 
institutionally to prevent criminal charges from being filed 
against a student for engaging in a schoolyard shoving match 
or cursing loudly in class.169 Therefore, a critical role exists for 
  
 165 Buss, supra note 3, at 570 (discussing institutional disadvantages of 
judicial determinations of school policies).  
 166 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).  
 167 Id. 
 168 Buss, supra note 3, at 571 (noting that, although “the public school context may 
require special latitude for educational or administrative judgment,” procedures involving 
alleged student misconduct are within “the field in which courts are most competent”).  
 169 See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 563 (1992) (noting that robust procedural 
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nonjudicial actors to ensure that these decisions are informed 
by the educational impact of discipline practices.170 Even with 
robust judicial procedural protections, nonjudicial actors 
including school boards, principals, teachers, and individual 
police officers will always retain a great deal of discretion in 
determining how to handle student misconduct. In light of the 
emerging empirical evidence, those charged with developing 
discipline practices should reduce reliance on law enforcement 
and instead institute practices that improve educational 
outcomes for youth.  
Policy makers in several jurisdictions have already 
taken the lead in examining the intersection between school 
discipline and law enforcement. For example, school officials in 
Clayton County, Georgia, a part of the Atlanta Metro region, 
convened a Blue Ribbon Commission to study school discipline 
issues.171 In its report, the Commission found that in the span of 
a few years, the number of student referrals to law 
enforcement per year grew from eighty-nine to 1,400.172 The 
Commission further found that most of the offenses involved 
minor incidents such as fights or disorderly conduct that “have 
traditionally been handled by the school and are not deemed 
the type of matters appropriate for juvenile court.”173 Based on 
these empirical findings, the chief judge of the local juvenile 
court convened a group of local stakeholders including parents, 
police officers, school officials, and juvenile public defenders to 
discuss the use of the juvenile justice system to maintain 
student discipline. After a series of roundtable meetings, 
participants reached a resolution that would further school 
safety and at the same time reduce the number of youth 
referred to juvenile court for school-based misconduct. The 
resulting cooperative agreement imposed a three-strikes policy 
for disciplinary infractions.174 The first time a child commits 
certain offenses identified as “focus acts”—affray, disruption of 
school, disorderly conduct, minor obstruction of the police, and 
  
protections mean little when there are no substantive limits to the government’s ability 
to define impermissible behavior, as in the situation of a school principal).  
 170 Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
2417 (2004) (discussing limits of litigation to create social change in education).  
 171 CLAYTON CNTY. PUB. SCH., BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE: A WRITTEN REPORT PRESENTED TO THE SUPERINTENDENT AND BOARD OF 
EDUCATION (1997). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Clayton County Cooperative Agreement (2007), available at 
http://www.juveniledefender.org/files/resources-juvenile-cooperative_agreement_070804.pdf. 
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criminal trespass—the student receives a warning rather than 
being referred to law enforcement, as was the prior practice.175 
If the youth commits one of these offenses a second time, the 
child is referred to a school conflict-diversion program, 
mediation program, or other court-sponsored program.176 It is 
only if the student commits the offense a third time that he or 
she may be referred to law enforcement.177  
Importantly, the Cooperative Agreement has succeeded 
not only in reducing the number of school-based arrests, but 
also in improving school order and, according to its advocates, 
educational outcomes. Since the agreement was implemented, 
the number of dangerous weapons incidents decreased by 70 
percent, fighting offenses decreased by 87 percent, and other 
focus acts decreased by 36 percent.178 Advocates for the reform 
effort maintain that the reduced reliance on school-based 
arrests furthers safety goals by facilitating nonadversarial 
relationships between students and authority figures.179 At the 
same time, graduation rates increased by 20 percent, although 
it is not clear that this can be attributed to the reduced reliance 
on law enforcement.180 Similar community reform efforts are 
underway in Denver, Baltimore, Raleigh, San Francisco, 
Atlanta, and Birmingham.181 These efforts suggest the 
possibility of effective reform by nonjudicial actors to ensure 
that mechanisms for maintaining school order actually benefit 
the educational interests of students.  
CONCLUSION 
Emerging empirical evidence casts significant doubt on 
the ongoing validity of doctrinal justifications for denying 
procedural protections to youth accused of misconduct in 
schools. Where a growing number of jurisdictions are relying on 
  
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 STOP THE SCH. HOUSE TO JAIL HOUSE TRACK, http://www.stopschoolstojails.org/ 
clayton-county-georgia.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2012); see also Stephen Teske, Power Point 
Presentation: Improving School & Community Safety: An Multi-Integrated Systems 
Approach (Apr. 10-13, 2010), available at http://juvjustice.org/media/resources/public/ 
resource_395.pdf. 
 179 STOP THE SCH. HOUSE TO JAIL HOUSE TRACK, supra note178. 
 180 Id.  
 181 See JASON LANGBERG ET AL., ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN’S SERVICES, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN WAKE COUNTY SCHOOLS: THE HUMAN, EDUCATIONAL, AND 
FINANCIAL COSTS 10-11 (2011), available at http://www.newsobserver.com/content/media/ 
2011/2/3/SRO%20Report.pdf. 
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law enforcement to maintain school order, the investigation 
and punishment of youth can no longer categorically be 
insulated from judicial scrutiny on the ground that it furthers 
the educational interests of the suspect-youth. Just as the 
Supreme Court in Gault confronted emerging factual evidence 
regarding the operation of the juvenile justice system to extend 
fuller procedural protections to youth in juvenile court, courts 
should consider how school discipline actually operates in 
today’s society and revisit the scope of procedural protections 
available to youth in public schools accordingly.  
This article provides a descriptive assessment of the 
increased criminalization of school discipline and its impact on 
youth and sets forth a means by which courts and policymakers 
should respond to these factual developments. The underlying 
causes of such criminalization and the reasons for the disparities 
among jurisdictions are beyond the scope of this article. Such 
factors may include the availability of federal funding for school 
resource officers, reduction of resources for classroom 
management training, overcrowded classrooms, income levels, 
racial demographics, and dismantling of desegregation decrees, 
among many others. Future research in this area will be 
important to ensure that youth benefit from the model of school 
discipline as educational tool idealized by the Court.  
